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ABSTRACT 
Labour law and services provided via online platforms or digital 
apps, platform work, appear to be an ill-matched couple as the business 
model of the platforms often relies on the worker not being an 
employee, whereas labour law categorises persons performing work as 
either self-employed or employees, depending on the circumstances of 
the relationship. Recent European and national case law concerning 
Uber illustrate that the classification of platform work is complicated. 
This article examines platform work in the light of the Danish model of 
providing a legal basis for decent pay and working conditions by way of 
collective bargaining. Collective agreements are a prerequisite for the 
Danish model to be extended to persons providing services via digital 
platforms. Platform businesses operate in an uncertain realm where the 
use of collective agreements could be questionable from a labour law as 
well as from a competition law perspective. The article takes a closer 
look at such legal perspectives by drawing out principles from national 
case law as well as case law of the European Court of Justice. The article 
further discusses a trial-agreement concluded between a trade union and 
a platform business in Denmark. The article concludes that collective 
agreements would be in line with the Danish model as well as with 
competition law, as long as the circumstances of each contract of service 
are characteristic of employment and as long as the service providers are 
not genuinely self-employed. The article contributes to the discourse on 
collective agreements as a means to ensure decent pay and working 
conditions as well as societal values and protections for persons 
providing services in the form of labour via online websites and digital 
apps. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Technological developments allow for new business models and 
new forms of work. This has always been the case. Recent developments 
in digital technology likewise enable new models for providing services. 
The use of online websites or digital apps to assist the exchange of 
services between private persons are often referred to as ‘platform 
economy’, and it is often promoted as a manner of executing the 
economic principle of sharing assets or services, referred to as the 
‘sharing economy’.1  
                                                        
1 E.g. <https://deleoekonomien.dk/> - The article in essence distinguishes between 
digital platforms as regards to the object of exchange. The term ‘sharing’ is appropriate, 
where assets are shared, such as a car or an apartment. As recognized for more than a 
century, labour is however not a commodity. Evidently, labor hours, as they are 
provided by a human being, cannot simply be shared as an ‘asset’, and thus is not 
appropriately categorised as ‘sharing economy’. This perspective is easily neglected - 
also in Denmark, e.g. in 2017, a trade association for platform businesses emerged with 





Business models vary, also businesses using digital platforms. There 
is no one-size-fits-all model for using online websites or apps to connect 
service providers and users. Certain elements can nonetheless be 
examined as typical. The term ‘platform work’ in this article thus refers 
to the phenomenon where a private person offers a service in the form 
of working hours to another private person or corporate entity, where 
the connection is made via an intermediary online website or a digital 
app. The person offering work is referred to as ‘service provider’, the 
website or app is referred to as ‘the platform’, the legal entity offering 
and constructing the model of the intermediary app or website is 
referred to as ‘the platform provider’, the recipient of the service is 
referred to as ‘the user’.2  
The dichotomy in labour and employment law provides that the 
relationship between the parties can be categorised as either one of 
employment or one of contracts for services by self-employed persons. 
This division is often referred to as ‘the binary divide’.3 As an employee a 
person is entitled to certain rights and protections, and as self-employed, 
any rights or protections are the responsibility of the service provider. In 
                                                                                                              
can earn and save money in sharing the available resources through collaborative 
platforms’, Foreningen for platformsøkonomi i Danmark <http://danskeplatforme.dk/>. 
Instead, in the view of the authors, digital platforms enable new and welcome avenues 
for providing services in the form of labour, e.g. cleaning services, transportation, etc., 
and could more accurately be termed new business models.   
2 See a.o. these sources for more on the legal aspects of platform work: Jeremias Prassl, 
‘Pimlico Plumbers, Uber Drivers, Cycle Couriers, and Court Translators: Who Is a 
Worker?’ (Social Science Research Network 2017) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2948712 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2948712> accessed 20 August 2018; Jeremias 
Prassl and Martin Risak, ‘Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as Employers - 
Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork’ (2015) 37 CLLPJ 619; Valerio De 
Stefano, ‘The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork 
and Labour Protection in the “Gig-Economy”’ (2016) Working paper 
<http://www.ilo.org/travail/whatwedo/publications/WCMS_443267/lang--
en/index.htm> accessed 20 August 2018; Jon Erik Dølvik and Kristin Jesnes, Nordic 
Labour Markets and the Sharing Economy : – Report from a Pilot Project (Nordisk Ministerråd 
2017) <http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:norden:org:diva-4754> accessed 20 
August 2018; Marianne Jenum Hotvedt, ‘Arbeidsgiveransvar i formidlingsøkonomien? 
Tilfellet Uber’ (2016) 55 Lov og Rett 484; Ane Kristiansen and Søren Kaj Andersen, 
‘Digitale platforme og arbejdsmarkedet’ (2017) 38 Forskningscenter for 
Arbejdsmarkeds- og Organisationsstudier <http://faos.ku.dk/publikationer> accessed 
20 August 2018; Miriam A Cherry and Antonio Aloisi, ‘“Dependent Contractors” in 
the Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach’ [2016] SSRN Electronic Journal 
<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2847869> accessed 20 August 2018; Jennifer Pinsof, 
‘A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification in the Modern Gig-
Economy’ (2016) MTTLR 22, 341. 
3 Alan Bogg and Mark Freedland, The Contract of Employment (Oxford University Press 
2016) 238 where the evolution of the binary divide is explored. 
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non-standard contracts of work the distinction can be blurred. This is 
apparent with work performed via platforms, where the platform 
provider often utilises a contractual term, by which the service provider 
is not an employee, but where at the same time the actual relationship 
between the platform and the service provider is atypical for self-
employed persons.  
The categorisation as employees or self-employed is of influence 
not only for the rights and protections of the individual service provider. 
Correct classification allows for fundamental societal considerations to 
be enforced. A number of employee rights and protections are a result of 
broader societal considerations and choices, e.g. ensuring a sustainable 
and healthy work force by providing safety at work, maximum working 
hours and paid annual leaves; a decent level of social security, e.g. 
pension payments, sick leave pay and maternity leave pay; and protecting 
societal values such as equality and protection against discrimination. 
Indeed, the classification as either employee or self-employed is vital to 
ensure that a given society’s basic rights and protection for persons 
performing work in employment also applies when such work is 
performed via an intermediary digital app or a website.4 
At the collective level where social partners aim to conclude 
collective agreements, the binary divide is likewise of essence. Collective 
agreements is the primary tool of choice to ensure a proper balance in 
the employment relationship as well as in society at large as a key feature 
of the Danish welfare system. However, if a service provider on digital 
platforms is categorised as self-employed, a collective agreement 
providing binding payment structures would violate competition law, 
collective action aimed at concluding agreements for genuinely self-
employed persons would be unlawful under Danish law, and the Labour 
Court would not have jurisdiction to assess complaints of breach of 
contract. And vice-versa. In April 2018, 3F, the largest trade union in 
Denmark (United Federation of Danish Workers) concluded a collective 
agreement with a digital platform, Hilfr, which acts as intermediary 
between private cleaners and customers.5 This article draws into focus 
existing labour law principles used to assess the status of persons in less 
than typical employment situations, case law from the Danish 
competition authorities and the CJEU regarding collective agreements 
for non-typical employment situations.6As the agreement with Hilfr is 
ground-breaking in Denmark, perhaps worldwide,7 the article also takes a 
closer look at the innovative elements of the agreement. 
                                                        
4 Prassl and Risak (n 2) 622. 
5 <https://www.3f.dk/english> accessed 20 August 2018. 
6 The agreement is available at 
<https://www.3f.dk/fagforening/fag/rengoeringsassistent-
(privatansat)/overenskomsten-hilfr> accessed 20 August 2018. 
7 Collective agreements for quasi self-employed are not uncommon. According to Eva 




2. THE DANISH MODEL 
Denmark is a small Scandinavian country of 5.7 million inhabitants.  
The Danish Constitution, dating back to 1849, establishes a 
constitutional monarchy and the framework for a democratic rule. The 
legislative power lies with the parliament and government in unison, and 
the rule of law is prevalent in Denmark.8   
In the late Nineteenth century, labour was in abundant supply, 
working conditions were very poor, and the only way to improve 
working conditions was by acting collectively to gain bargaining leverage. 
A system of collective bargaining and conflicts emerged. In 1899, a 
lengthy nationwide conflict was brought to an end with the historic 
September Agreement. The September Agreement carved out the 
fundamental principles for the industrial relations system in Denmark, 
and recognised inter alia the right to bargain collectively, the right to 
strike, the duty of peace and the employer’s managerial power. The social 
partners acknowledged the opposite party’s right to exist and the right 
for employees and employers to freely join trade unions and employer’s 
confederations.9 These principles continue to be the foundation of the 
Danish collective bargaining system.10 In 1910, parliament provided a 
dispute resolution system, based on a distinction between conflicts of 
interest and conflicts of rights, whereas conflicts of rights should be 
settled by way of dispute resolution rather than by way of conflict. 
Statutory legislation provided a specialised and effective dispute 
resolution system for the social partners, i.e. the Act on the Labour 
Court, Arbejdsretsloven11 and the Act on a Public Conciliator, 
Forligmandsloven.12 The social partners are otherwise self-regulatory as 
there is no statutory regulation of trade unions, collective agreements 
                                                                                                              
Submissive Employee? Reflections on ECJ, C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie’, in 
Maciej Laga and others (eds.), Labour Law and Social Rights in Europe. The Jurisprudence of 
International Courts (Gdansk University Press 2017), one social partner has adopted 
minimum fees for self-employed persons in a.o. architectural firms in the Netherlands. 
8 E.g. Denmark tops the World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, 2017-18, 
<https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/publications/rule-law-index-reports/wjp-
rule-law-index-2017-2018-report> 
9 Ole Hasselbalch, Labour Law in Denmark (Fourth edition, Kluwer Law International B 
V 2016) 32; Jens Kristiansen, The Growing Conflict between European Uniformity and National 
Flexibility: The Case of Danish Flexicurity and European Harmonisation of Working Condition 
(DJØF 2015) 25. 
10 E.g. recognized in the current version of the General Agreement concluded by the 
Danish Employers’ Confederation, DA, and the Danish Confederation of Trade 
Unions, LO, <http://www.da.dk/bilag/General%20Agreement_net.pdf> 
11 Statutory Act no. 1003 of 24/08/2017 on the Labour Court and industrial 
arbitrations. Available in English at <http://arbejdsretten.dk/generelt/labour-
court/labour-court-act.aspx> accessed 19 April 2018. 
12 Statutory Act no. 709 of 20/08/2002 on Conciliation in Collective Disputes. 
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and the lawfulness of industrial conflicts.13 The right to collective 
bargaining is not explicitly protected in the constitution.14 
The State interferes as little as possible in matters regarding pay and 
working conditions. Such matters are considered to be more suitably 
settled by way of collective bargaining.15 This understanding is supported 
by a very high unionisation rate,16 in 2017 approx. 67%, and a high 
coverage of collective agreements, in 2015 approx. 74% of private sector 
and 100% of public sector employees.17 Within the boundaries of the 
labour market, the social partners act as the primary legislative power.18 
As a result, there is no general statutory legislation on what constitutes 
an employment relationship, on working conditions, minimum wages,19 
normal daily or weekly working hours20, overtime payment, sick leave 
pay, maternity leave pay, pensions, continuing education or lawful 
termination of employment.21 Statutory regulation is traditionally passed 
only when avenues of negotiation have been exhausted  in areas of social 
security, or for groups of workers in need of special protection or 
traditionally not unionised. Working conditions in Denmark are 
primarily regulated by way of collective agreements.22 This system of 
bargaining is referred to as the Danish model. Denmark’s membership 
of the European Union and the duty to implement directives by 
statutory law has forced the legislators to play a more active role.23 At the 
political level, Denmark is reluctant towards EU legislation on topics 
                                                        
13 Hasselbalch (n 9) 51. 
14 Jens Kristiansen, Den Kollektive Arbejdsret (3rd ed, Jurist- og Økonomforbundet 2014) 
112. 
15 Hasselbalch (n 9) 44; Kristiansen (n 9) 13. 
16 In 2008 the average unionization rate in Europe was less than 25 percent. Kristiansen 
(n 9) 45. 
17 Dagpengekommissionen, Det Danske Arbejdsmarked, Oktober 2015, 22 . 
18 Hasselbalch (n 9) 44. 
19 There are only three minor exceptions: vocational trainees are by statutory legislation 
ensured a minimum wage equal to the wage in the normal collective agreement in the 
trade in question and the pay of ‘crown servants’ is ultimately fixed by the Parliament, if 
the organizations do not come to an understanding during the negotiations. And finally, 
if the job is created as a initiative under the public unemployment scheme, a statutory 
act requires the pay to be settled according to the collective agreement within the trade. 
Hasselbalch (n 9) 135. 
20 ibid 120. 
21 Kristiansen (n 9) 31. The provisions with formal and substantive criteria for lawful 
dismissals exist, but are fragmented. E.g. Statutory Acts applicable to all employees 
prohibit dismissal on specific grounds, and Statutory Acts for certain groups of 
employees provide notice-periods and a standard of reasonableness in cases of 
dismissal. 
22 ‘COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT WITH ERGA OMNES APPLICABILITY | 
Eurofound’ <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/efemiredictionary/collective-
agreement-with-erga-omnes-applicability> accessed 19 April 2018. 




traditionally reserved for collective bargaining.24 At the legal level, the 
social partners aim to implement EU Directives by collective 
agreements, supplemented by minimum legislation applicable to those 
who are not covered by an implementing agreement.25  
Collective agreements are automatically binding for signatories and 
their members, but not applicable erga omnes.26 Employers can be bound 
either via membership of an employers’ association, party to an 
agreement, or through an individual agreement with a trade union.27 
Agreements define their own scope of application. Typically, the 
agreement provides that when an agreement is in force, the employer 
must extend the provisions to all employees performing the type of work 
covered by the agreement, regardless of their membership status. 
Sectoral agreements typically run for a period of 2-3 years and regulate 
material working conditions such as wages, working hours, overtime pay, 
rules of termination and work place union representatives.28 
For persons performing work via digital platforms in Denmark 
who would be categorised as employees, the customary avenue of 
ensuring reasonable pay and working conditions is by way of concluding 
collective agreements.29 
3. NOTION OF EMPLOYEE – AN OVERVIEW 
At the collective level the question of employee-status has surfaced 
in Danish law not only with regards to who is eligible to receive the 
rights provided for in the agreement, but also in regards to the 
                                                        
24 E.g. a unified ‘no’ to the European Commission’s 2014 proposal to legislate on  
minimum wages in all EU Member States,  ‘Denmark: Heated Debate about 
Introducing Minimum Wage | Eurofound’ 
<https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2015/denmark-heated-
debate-about-introducing-minimum-wage> accessed 20 August 2018. 
25 This has been the model of implementation since 2001, where Denmark passed 
supplementing statutory legislation to implement Directive 97/81 concerning the 
Framework Agreement on part-time work. 
26 Kristiansen (n 9) 40; The members of the signing organizations can be seen as 
‘partakers’ rather than ‘parties’ given the very limited right to supplement or deviate 
from the agreement they are bound by through their membership of the organisation. 
Hasselbalch (n 9) 58. 
27 If the employer is not a member of an employer organization, the employer can 
accede to the industry wide agreement by concluding an adoption agreement with a 
national trade union party to such an industry wide agreement. 
28 Hasselbalch (n 9) 60. 
29 For some groups of employees, the legislators have provided, that pay and working 
conditions must abide by the standards in the agreements concluded by the ‘most 
representative’ associations in Denmark. This is the case for e.g. posted workers, taxi-
drivers, and apprentices.  
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jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the lawfulness of collective action.30 
This section gives an overview of the general principles for assessing 
employee status as the basic foundation for the assessment at the 
individual level.  
There is no uniform statutory definition of what constitutes an 
‘employee’.31 The question of whether at person is entitled to certain 
rights as an employee is assessed according to the specific scope and 
definition provided in the relevant legal basis compared to the 
particularities of the relationship in casu.32 The sui generis definition of 
the term ‘employee’ would be ‘a person receiving remuneration for 
personal work in a service relationship’.33 General principles of what is 
characteristic for an employment relationship has been derived from case 
law. Most notably, the status agreed to by the parties themselves is 
indicative but not decisive. The Danish approach is functional, based on 
the social realities of the relationship between the parties.34  
First, and often most prevalent, is the degree of the right of the 
employer to make decisions in the contractual relationship and the duty 
of the employee to follow such directives. In platform work, this would 
concern instructions on how the work is to be performed, a right to 
control the work, and a duty of the service provider to report to the 
platform. Second important feature is the economic arrangement between 
the parties, in particular how the remuneration is calculated and paid. It 
is characteristic of an employment relationship that the employee 
receives set remunerations calculated on the basis of time or results. The 
employee typically does not bear the risk of the success of the work, and 
likewise does not benefit from surplus. An employee typically does not 
bear the costs related to the work, such as materials. It is characteristic of 
self-employment to pay for an office/workshop, materials, tools, and to 
pay sales tax, etc. Third, a duty to perform the work personally is typical 
of an employment relationship. Fourth, the degree of connectedness 
between the parties, such as the length of the work, the intensity of the 
contractual relationship, and whether the contract supplies the main or 
supplementing income for the worker. Fifth, the social perception of the 
relationship, i.e. whether the worker in relation to the social perception 
and to his occupational position is similar to an ordinary employee.35 
None of these elements are decisive in themselves, and the Court will 
                                                        
30 Ole Hasselbalch, ’Arbejdsretten’, III, 1.2.2., <http://arbejdsretu.lovportaler.dk/> 
Accessed 20 August 2018. 
31 Jens Kristiansen, ‘The concept of employee: the position in Denmark’, in Bernd 
Waas and Guus Heerma von Voss (eds.), Restatement of Labour Law in Europe, Volume I, 
The Concept of Employee, Hart 2017. 
32 Hasselbalch (n 30) III, 1. 
33 Kristiansen (n 31), 135, Statutory Act no 240 of 17/03/2010 on a Written Statement, 
s 1(2). 
34 Hasselbalch (n 30) III, 1. 




carry out the assessment based on all the circumstances of each specific 
case.  
The notion of employee is not constant, and legislation as well as 
case law take into consideration aspects outside the relationship between 
the employer and the employee. This is the case for legislation with an 
underlying health or social security purpose,36, statutory acts based on 
EU-directives which must be applied in conformity with the underlying 
EU directive and CJEU case law,37 and legislation counteracting risks of 
abuse.38  
So far, no case law has emerged in Danish labour law specifically 
assessing the employment status of service providers under digital 
platforms. However, it is very likely that, depending on the specific setup 
of the individual platform business, the degree of influence on setting 
the prices, the degree of instructions as to how to carry out the work or 
on personal conduct when providing services, the degree of managerial 
powers delegated to the platform provider or its algorithm, the degree of 
elements of the algorithm influencing the economic foundation for the 
earnings, would render that the relationship could be assessed more 
characteristic of employment than of self-employed. 
Even if the classification of a person under Danish law would be as 
self-employed, this cannot exclude a person from being classified as a 
worker under EU law, and as such being eligible to enjoy rights provided 
in EU directives.39 
In Lawrie-Blum the Court adopted a definition, whereby:  
 ‘The essential feature of an employment relationship [ ] is that for a certain 
period of time a person performs services for and under the direction of another person 
in return for which he receives remuneration’40 
A key feature of being classified as employee in EU law is the 
element of subordination to the employer’s directions and the element of 
performing work for an external entity. A self-employed person under 
EU-law can choose the type and amount of work and tasks to be 
                                                        
36 E.g. the Holiday Act, Ferieloven, the Act on Occupational Injury Insurance, 
Arbejdsskadesikringsloven, the Act on Sick Leave Benefits, Sygedagpengeloven, the Act on 
Unemployment Insurance Benefits, Arbejdsløshedsforsikringsloven, and the Act on 
Supplementing Pensions Payments, ATP-loven, Hasselbalch (n 30) III, 1.2.1., 1), and the 
Act on Occupational Health and Safety, Arbejdsmiljøloven, Hasselbalch (n 30) III, 1.2.1., 
2). 
37 E.g. the Act on a Written Statement, Ansættelsesbevisloven, the Act on Equal Treatment 
of Men and Women in regards to Access to Employment, Ligebehandlingsloven, and the 
Act on Non-Discrimination in Employment, Forskelsbehandlingsloven, Hasselbalch (n 30)  
III, 1.2.1., 2); Ole Hasselbalch, ‘Lønmodtagerbegrebet i EU-retlig kontekst’, (2018) EU-
ret og menneskeret, 25, 3. 
38 E.g. the Act on Bankruptcy, Konkursloven, and the Act on an Employees’ 
Remuneration Guarantee Fund, Lov om lønmodtagernes garantifond. 
39 On the concept of employee in EU law and Danish law, see Hasselbalch (n 37). 
40 Case C-66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1985, para 17. 
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executed and performs work via the organisational entity of his own 
business. The case law of the CJEU additionally suggests that self-
employed persons can lose their qualification as independent 
undertakings if the independence of a self-employed person is merely 
notional, thereby disguising an employment relationship, the CJEU in 
Allonby.41 Likewise, if undertakings operate as auxiliary organs forming an 
integral part of the principal’s undertaking, as promoted in Confederación 
Española.42 In FNV43 the Court provided that self-employed persons 
could be ‘fake self-employed’ in that they did not enjoy the freedom 
typical of self-employed status under each specific contract, see further 
section 5.1.2.  
In Uber Systems Spain the Court considered Uber to primarily be a 
transport service because of the decisive influence over the conditions 
for transportation and the conduct of the drivers.44 The Court did not 
take a specific stance on the employment status of the Uber-drivers, but 
the decisive influences strongly indicate a status as employees.45 The 
Court reiterated its view on Uber as primarily being a transport service 
and, accordingly, not an ‘information society service’ in the later Uber 
France SAS case.46 
4. EMPLOYEE - COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ASPECTS 
Collective agreements are concluded between a collective entity 
representing employees and an employers’ association or a single 
employer. The status of service providers via platforms as employees or 
self-employed with regard to collective agreements presents additional 
legal thresholds, namely the lawfulness of collective action, the 
                                                        
41  Case C-256/01 Allonby [2004], para 71.  
42  Case C-217/05 Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio [2006], para 
43 vis-à-vis agents and their principal. 
43 Case C-413/13 FNV KIEM [2014].  
44 Case C-434/15 Uber Systems Spain SL [2017],  para 39. 
45 Other jurisdictions have assessed the status of Uber-drivers. In the UK, Aslam and 
others v Uber B.V. and others, the Employment Tribunal found an Uber driver to be a 
‘worker’ for the purpose of the Employment Rights Act 1996, Employment Tribunals 
28.10.2016, 2202551/2015 upheld by Employment Appeal Tribunal 10.11.2017, Appeal 
No. UKEAT/0056/17/DA. Conversely, the Australian Fair Work Commission on 21 
December 2017 concluded that an Uber driver was not an employee and not protected 
against unfair dismissal. 
46 Case C-320/16 Uber France SAS [2018], para 22. Similarly, the status of Deliveroo 
drivers/food deliveries in other jurisdictions. The UK Central Arbitration Committee 
did not consider Deliveroo-drivers to be employees, cf TUR 1/985(2016), Independent 
Workers’ Union of Great Britain (IWGB) v RooFoods Limited T/A Deliveroo, and similarly in 
Italy regarding a similar food delivery service, Foodora, cf Tribunale Ordinario di Torino, 
Sentenza n. 778/2018 pubbl. il. 07/05/2018 RG n. 4764/2017; The Spanish Juzgado 
de lo Social in Valencia found Deliveroo-drivers to be workers, cf SENTENCIA del 




jurisdiction of the Labour Court, and the lawfulness of agreements 
concerning remuneration under competition law. 
4.1. COMPETITION LAW AND PLATFORM WORK 
The purpose of bargaining pay and working conditions collectively 
is, inter alia, to restrict the internal competition for jobs between 
employees, which historically has led to the ‘race to the bottom’.  
Collective agreements in reality restrict competition. In a narrow 
sense by essentially fixating the labour costs of the employer, as well as 
indirectly by appointing a specific financial institution as the sole 
provider of e.g. compulsory occupational pensions.47 
In Denmark, section 3 of the Statutory Act on Competition, 
Konkurrenceloven48 explicitly provides that the act does not apply to salaries 
and working conditions. This exemption has been in force since the first 
Act on Price Agreements in 193649 was continued in the Act on 
Monopolies in 1955 amendments50 and is now an essential feature of the 
Competition Act. According to the preparatory works, collective 
agreements are not acts of unilateral price fixing, but are the result of 
negotiations between two opposing parties pursuing specific interests, 
where the element of negotiation ensures that the provisions are well-
balanced.51 The social partners pursue social rather than competitive 
interests.52 The mechanism of collective bargaining ensures societal 
considerations as well as counteracts abuse of power by the social 
partners.53 Although collective action is invoked with the purpose of 
applying pressure on the opposite party,54 the mitigating function of the 
Public Conciliator and the legal principles developed in case law ensure 
that such actions remain proportional to the aim of the conflict.55 
The legal test for exemption under section 3 is qualitative. If a 
collective agreement does not regulate salaries and working conditions, 
the agreement is not exempt from competition law.56 
                                                        
47 Ruth Nielsen, 'Samspillet mellem konkurrenceretten og arbejdsretten', in Jens Hartig 
Danielsen and others (eds.), Festskrift Til Jens Fejø (DJØF 2012) 324. 
48 Statutory Act no 155 of 1/3/2018 on Competition, 
49 Statutory Act on Price Agreements, Prisaftaleloven, Rigsdagstidende 1936-37, 4948. 
50 Statutory Act on Supervision regarding Monopoly and Obstacles to Competition, 
section 2(2), Lov om tilsyn med monopol og konkurrencebegrænsninger, no 102 of 31/3/1955, 
and report of the Ministry of Industry, ‘Fra monopollov til konkurrencelov’, 
Betænkning 1075/1986, 35 and 52.  
51 Rigsdagstidende 1936-37, 4948 
52 Hasselbalch (n 30) XXI, 2.2. 
53 Hasselbalch (n 30) XXI, 2.2 
54 Collective action can in Denmark lawfully be invoked by the workers’ (strikes and 
blockades) as well as by the employers’ (lockout and boycott) representatives. 
55 Hasselbalch (n 30) XXI, 2.2 
56 Hasselbalch (n 30) XXI, 2.2 
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At the EU level, collective agreements are not expressly exempt 
from the scope of Article 101(1) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
EU (TFEU). The social aim of collective agreements can however 
outweigh the aim of unrestricted competition, as will be elaborated 
further below in 4.1.2.  
4.1.1. DANISH COMPETITION AUTHORITIES – CASE LAW ON ATYPICAL 
EMPLOYEES AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
The case law of the Danish competition authorities illustrates that it is 
possible for collective agreements to fulfil the conditions in section 3 
even for self-employed persons, when entering into contracts of business 
on similar working conditions as regular employees. The term used is 
indicative but not decisive, and the specifics of the circumstances must 
be compared to the characteristics of those performing services in 
permanent employment and to those genuinely self-employed. 
Determining factors are that self-employed workers perform services 
under the same terms as employees, at the same entity and under the 
instruction of the employer whilst performing the tasks. Likewise, it is 
taken into consideration whether the agreement provides pay and 
working conditions typical for the industry, and whether mandatory 
social security payments were made.  
This was the case in a ruling in 199357 where the Competition 
Appeals Tribunal took into account that the use of the term ‘freelance’ 
indicated that the agreement did not concern ‘pay and working 
conditions’, the freelance photographers had registered businesses with a 
duty to pay sales taxes, and the relationship with the media houses with 
regard to power of instruction and loyalty obligations did not differ 
significantly from what is often the case in commercial relations. As 
such, some persons covered by the agreement would in fact be genuinely 
self-employed, and for these persons the price-list was a violation of the 
Competition Act.  
Likewise, in a ruling concerning freelancers from 1999,58 where a 
‘Guideline’ for pay and working terms was assessed, the term ‘freelance’ 
was used for any employment contract of less than 6 months, including 
casual contracts. As the Guideline in reality regulated prices for self-
employed, the Tribunal stated that the proper mechanism would be to 
conclude collective agreements. However, freelance journalists providing 
services on casual contracts cannot be classified as self-employed solely 
because the assignments are not permanent. As the services of casual 
freelance journalists had the same characteristics as the services of the 
permanent employees at the same media houses, the Guideline was 
similar to collective agreement provisions concerning casual work, and 
was exempt from the Competition Act.  
                                                        
57 Section 70-76 of Competition Appeals Tribunal Ruling of 10/9/2003 (n 60). 




In 2003,59 the Tribunal assessed the lawfulness of a notice of 
collective action. The collective action was in support of a claim for a 
collective agreement providing standard payments for freelance 
journalists. The dispute concerned whether the notice, using the term 
freelancers, would cover also self-employed persons and constitute a 
breach of the Competition Act. The union argued that the term 
‘freelancer’ covered two groups of workers providing services on casual 
contracts but not genuinely self-employed freelancers. The Tribunal 
returned the case for renewed deliberation without assessing the 
substance of the case as the notice could unintentionally include 
genuinely self-employed persons. The case was later withdrawn.60  
In 2005,61 the Tribunal inter alia62 ruled on fixed prices for 
veterinary services. A collective agreement provided set hourly rates for 
meat quality controls63 for employed as well as for substitute 
veterinarians. The substitute veterinarians providing the services could 
be employed elsewhere and could also be self-employed. The distinction 
between salaries and working conditions on the one side, and terms for 
conducting trade between businesses on the other side, should be carried 
out comparing the circumstances of the situation to the characteristics of 
either employment status or self-employed services. The starting point is 
whether one person is under the instruction of the other party, including 
a right to dismiss. A duty to pay mandatory contributions to social 
security measures, such as social pensions, sick leave payments and 
occupational injury insurance, is also characteristic of employment status. 
The Tribunal stated that the veterinarians were under the instruction of 
the public authority while providing the services, that payments were 
paid out as ordinary remuneration, and that the veterinarians accrued 
holidays with pay and social security contributions. The Tribunal also 
noted that the substitutes performed the work as a supplement to their 
main occupation. It was significant that during the contracts, the 
substitute veterinarians provided services under the same working 
conditions as permanently employed veterinarians. The Tribunal 
regarded the veterinarians as employees during the substitute contracts, 
                                                        
59 Competition Appeals Tribunal Ruling of 10/9 2003, J.nr. 02-85.078, j.nr. 02-85.080 
og j.nr. 02-85.081 <https://www.kfst.dk/media/14175/20030910-kendelse-tv2-
danmark-danske-dagblades-forenings-forhandlingsorganisation-og-dansk-
magasinp.pdf> accessed 20 August 2018.  
60 Press release 25/2/2004: 
<https://www.kfst.dk/afgoerelser-
ruling/konkurrenceomraadet/styrelsesafgoerelser/2004/dansk-journalistforbunds-
varsling-af-kollektive-kampskridt/> accessed 20 August 2018. 
61 Ruling of 26 October 2005, j.nr. 3/1120-0301-0374/SEK/LOB, 
<https://www.kfst.dk/media/13665/20051026-afgoerelse-praktiserende-dyrlaegers-
arbejdsgiverforenings-vedtaegter.pdf> accessed 20 August 2018.  
62 Other questions were assessed.   
63 Ruling of 2005 (n 62), para 29-34 and 65-77. 
PLATFORM WORK AND THE DANISH MODEL 130 
regardless of their main occupation as self-employed, and the agreements 
were exempt from the Competition Act. 
In particular, the choice to compare the circumstances under each 
contract was innovative and relevant, and an approach that also the 
CJEU has taken, see 4.1.2.  
4.1.2. CASE LAW OF THE COURT OF THE JUSTICE OF THE EU 
Article 101(1) in the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) 
prohibits all agreements which may prevent, restrict or distort 
competition within the internal market. Agreements determining 
minimum prices are mentioned as the first example of ‘blacklisted’ 
measures in Article 101(1) TFEU, as they ‘directly or indirectly fix purchase or 
selling prices or any other trading conditions’. Such agreements, fixing minimum 
prices for an industry, have, in the case law of the CJEU, consistently 
been considered to entail a significant restriction on competition.64 CJEU 
case law has, however, exempted agreements regarding salaries and 
working conditions, which corresponds with the approach in Danish 
competition law.65 
In the case of Albany, the Court assessed whether collective 
agreements establishing mandatory and exclusive pension funds 
constituted an unlawful restriction of competition. Advocate General 
Jacobs argued that collective agreements are, by their very nature, 
restrictive of competition, since generally employees cannot offer to 
work for wages below the agreed minimum.66 In reality, collective 
agreements probably do not have a notable restrictive effect on the 
competition between employers.67 The CJEU found it beyond question 
that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective 
agreements. However, as collective agreements pursue social policy 
objectives of improving living and working conditions and provide social 
protection,68 they were not a violation of the provisions in the Treaty.  
The CJEU has on this account accepted that mandatory pensions,69 
social security schemes with regard to occupational injuries,70 and 
insurance with regards to sickness leave,71 are outside the scope of 
                                                        
64 FNV KIEM (n 44) Opinion AG Wahl, paras 35 -36 referring to case C-243/83 
Binion, para 44. 
65 Ruth Nielsen, ‘Kollektive overenskomster og konkurrenceretten’, (2001) Ufr 
2001B.27. 
66 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] Opinion AG Jacobs, para 178. 
67 ibid, para 182 in which he points to the labour costs being only one of many 
production cost factors. 
68 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999], para 59. 
69 C-67/96 (n 69); joined Cases C-115/97 and C-117/97Brentjens’ Handelsonderneming 
BV [1999]: Case C-2019/97 Drijvende Bokken [1999]; joined Cases C-180/98 and C-
184/98 Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten [2000].  
70 Case C-218/00 Cisal [2002]. 




Article 101(1).72 The Court takes the view that the social objectives 
would be seriously undermined if management and labour were subject 
to Article (85(1) (now Article 101(1)) of the Treaty when seeking jointly 
to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and employment,73 
and that agreements concluded in the context of collective negotiations 
between management and labour in pursuit of such objectives must be 
regarded as falling outside the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.74  
However, the exemption is not without limits. In 2004, the 
European Commission pursued the Belgian Architects’ Association for 
breach of Article 101(1) TFEU by adopting a scale of set fees for 
architects.75 According to the Commission, architects are undertakings 
because they provide services on a long-term basis and for 
remuneration.76 As a result the fee scale was an independent act by the 
association of a prescriptive character77 with the object of restricting 
competition, and the  association was imposed a fine of 100.000 Euros.78  
In a more recent CJEU ruling, FNV from 2014, the Court assessed 
the line between employed or self-employed with regard to self-
employed Dutch musicians. A Dutch association for self-employed 
musicians, FNV, concluded a collective agreement with a Dutch 
orchestra’s association, providing fixed minimum fees for self-employed 
musicians when providing services as substitutes in orchestras.79 The 
CJEU reiterated the arguments of Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken 
that self-employed service providers are – in principle – undertakings 
subject to Article 101(1). Self-employed persons offer their services for 
remuneration on the market and in relation to the principal perform 
their activities as independent economic operators.80  
If an association acts in the name of and on behalf of self-
employed service providers, the association does not act as a social 
partner, but as an association of undertakings.81 Such agreements would 
therefore not be the result of collective bargaining between employers 
and employees and would not be exempt from the scope of Article 101. 
The Treaty encourages dialogue between management and labour in 
                                                        
72 The Danish Labour Court in ruling of 17 November 2000, AR 1996.225, aligned its 
case law with the rulings of the ECJ in Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken, Nielsen (n 
66) 31. 
73 C-115/97 (n 70) para 56. 
74 ibid para 57. 
75 Orde van Architecten (Commission Decision of 24 June 2004), para 1. 
76 ibid para 38. 
77 ibid para 78. 
78 ibid para 138. 
79  C-413/13 (n 44) para 6. See also Eva Grosheide and Mark Barenberg, ‘Minimum 
Fees for the Self-Employed: A European Response to the Uber-ized Economy’, (2016) 
22(2) CJEL 194. 
80 C-413/13 (n 44) para 27. 
81 ibid  para 28-30. 
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order to improve working conditions; the Treaty does not however 
encourage dialogue between self-employed service providers.82 If an 
agreement is concluded on behalf of self-employed service providers, it 
is not a result of negotiations between employers and employees and is 
not exempt from the scope of Article 101 TFEU. If, on the other hand, 
the self-employed service providers were in fact ‘false self-employed’, 
that is, if they are service providers in a situation comparable to that of 
employees,83 agreements concluded on their behalf would be regarded as 
a result of negotiations between employers and employees. 
It is not always easy to establish the status of self-employed persons 
as ‘undertakings’.84 A service provider can lose his status of ‘self-
employed’ if he does not determine his own conduct on the market, is 
entirely dependent on his principal, does not bear any of the financial or 
commercial risks, and thus operates as an auxiliary within the principal’s 
undertaking.85 On the other hand, an essential feature of being an 
‘employee’ is that for a certain period of time one person performs 
services of and under the direction of another person in return for which 
he receives remuneration.86 According to Advocate General Wahl, the 
provisions of the TFEU Treaty on ‘employment’ (Articles 145 to 150 
TFEU) and ‘social policy’ (Articles 151 to 161 TFEU) all centre on the 
notion of the ‘worker’.87 The decisive factor is whether the person acts 
under the direction of an employer, in particular with regard to his 
freedom to choose the time, place and content of his work, does not 
share the employer’s commercial risks, and, for the duration of that 
relationship, forms an integral part of that employer’s undertaking, 
forming an economic unit.88 The Court stated that in order for the 
substitute musicians to be classified, not as ‘workers’ but as genuine 
‘undertakings’, the national courts must ascertain whether the 
circumstances are similar to characteristics of ‘workers’ under EU law. 
Particular emphasis should be put on whether the relationship with the 
orchestra would not be one of subordination under the duration of the 
contract, e.g. whether the substitutes enjoy more independence and 
flexibility than employees performing the same activity, when comparing 
                                                        
82 ibid para 29, with reference to joined cases C-180/98 and C-184/98, Pavlov and others, 
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83 ibid, para 31.  
84 ibid, para 32. 
85 ibid, para 33 
86 ibid, para 34, with reference to recent cases of C-46/12 N, para 40, and C-270/13 
Haralambidis, para 28. 
87  C-413/13 (n 44) paras 36-40. 
88 ibid, para 36, referring to cases C-256/01, Allonby, para 72; C-3/87, Agegate, para 36; 




the determination of working hours, the place and manner of performing 
the tasks assigned, i.e. the rehearsals and concerts.89 
Notably, the Court used the criteria established in case law for 
losing status as an ‘undertaking’, i.e. not having the independence and 
flexibility during the contract’s characteristic of self-employed. The 
Court found that during the performances of the contracts, the self-
employed musicians were in fact in a comparable situation to the 
employees, as the self-employed musicians did not enjoy more freedom 
during the contracts compared to the employed musicians, but would be 
under instructions as to the time, place and manner of performing music 
alongside the employed musicians. The Court introduced the notion 
‘false independent’ for self-employed persons providing services in a 
situation comparable to ‘workers’. 
It could be questioned if the Court, by introducing the concept of 
‘false self-employed’, meant to introduce a new category or a third 
category in between the status as employee or self-employed 
undertaking. Similarly, whether the Court intended to prevent abusive 
misclassifications by promoting a realist assessment of the binary divide 
as seen in previous cases.90 The realist mode of interpretation prescribed 
puts much emphasis on determining whether the service provider is a 
subordinate of the employer. In the case of FNV this would be 
sufficiently fulfilled by comparing the independence or subordination of 
the substitutes whilst performing one single contract of service as a 
musician. Whether or not the substitutes were genuinely independent in 
other contracts or in between orchestra contracts was not assessed and 
could be viewed as having no relevance to the assessment of whether 
they had lost their full status as an ‘undertaking’ in relation to this one 
type of contract, and as such on the classification of the provisions in the 
collective agreement applying to the substitutes.   
From the case law of Denmark and the CJEU, collective 
agreements could be accepted for persons providing services via digital 
platforms as not being in violation of competition law, as the 
relationship during the performance of the contracts would be viewed as 
most similar to employment, which is the approach of Danish law, or 
most dissimilar to genuine self-employment, which is the most recent 
approach of the CJEU.   
The term used to denote the service provider or the contractual 
basis as casual is indicative but not decisive.  
Even unilaterally issued guidelines and recommendations that are 
not the result of a collective bargaining process could be exempt from 
                                                        
89 C-413/13 (n 44), para 37. The national Court of Appeals of The Hague determined, 
that the self-employed substitutes were in fact ‘false self-employed’ and that the 
stipulation of minimum fees fell ‘by reason of its nature and purpose’ outside the scope 
of Article 101(1) TFEU, Grosheide and Barenberg (n 80), 223. 
90 Grosheide and Barenberg (n 80) 224. 
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the Danish Competition Act. Insofar as the content reflects negotiated 
provisions in agreements and insofar as the working conditions are 
exactly the same as those covered by the existing agreements, such 
unilateral recommendations would not constitute a risk of abuse or 
violations of Danish competition law. The status under EU law of 
unilateral recommendations is more uncertain. 
EU competition law has room for allowing collective agreements to 
be negotiated for workers in atypical employment relationships as long as 
the collective agreement pursues a social purpose and has a collective 
entity representing employees on the employee side.  
Danish competition law as well as recent EU case law on Article 
101(1) TFEU allow the assessment of the classification of the 
relationship to be performed on one single contract of work, 
emphasising the degree of flexibility and independence during the 
contract compared to employed persons performing the same work.  
In this sense, it would be likely to find examples of service 
providers via platforms who provide services on limited contracts, and 
where for the duration of the contract the service provider would be in a 
situation of subordination in particular regarding the time, place and 
manner of work, as soon as the contract terms have been accepted by 
the self-employed person. This could be the case when a platform 
worker has accepted an offer of e.g. cleaning, and the cleaning must be 
performed at the time, place and in a manner adhering to training or 
directions set out by the platform provider. Some platform workers 
could also very likely – as highlighted in the FNV case – be viewed as 
not taking a commercial risk, but instead becoming an auxiliary to the 
principal, an integral part of the platform’s undertaking.  
4.2. LAWFULNESS OF STRIKE AND SECONDARY ACTION 
The status of the service providers as employees or self-employed 
also influences the lawfulness of collective action under Danish 
collective labour law. In Denmark, a social partner can demand that an 
employer enters into a collective agreement, and this can be supported 
by way of collective action. One of the prerequisites for lawful collective 
action91 is that the social partner has a reasonable interest in concluding 
an agreement with the specific employer for the specific type of work. 
This entails that the entity has employees who perform the type of work 
covered by the agreement or by the social partner demanding the 
agreement.92  
In 2007,93 the Labour Court assessed the lawfulness of collective 
action in support of a collective agreement for freelance journalists. The 
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dispute hinged on the employment status of freelance journalists 
providing services to the employer. The freelance journalists performed 
work of the same character, under the same working conditions and with 
the same remuneration as permanently employed journalists. The media 
houses receiving the services withheld taxes on behalf of the freelancers, 
some freelance assignments were partly permanent and editors could 
adjust the materials delivered by freelancers. The Labour Court, referring 
to the ruling of 1999 of the Competition Tribunal,94 stated that 
freelancers are not considered self-employed persons solely based on the 
services being provided as individual assignments. When the service is 
provided on terms that are more characteristic of employees than of self-
employed persons, this is a basis for negotiating pay and working 
conditions for the freelance journalists. The freelance journalists 
performing casual work thus constituted an interest of the trade union to 
conclude an agreement for journalists, including freelance journalists. 
Additionally, the Labour Court stated that secondary action in support of 
a main conflict for freelance workers could be lawful, and that members 
of the same trade union could refuse to perform work targeted by the 
main conflict, so-called ‘strike work’, also when the subjects of the 
conflict were freelance journalists. Finally, the Labour Court approved a 
right to engage in collective action for the freelancers performing work 
on employee-like working terms.  
The approach of the Labour Court resembles the approach of the 
CJEU in the FNV case, and the Competition Appeals Tribunal in the 
case regarding substitute veterinarians.  
It would be in line with labour law principles to view persons 
providing services via digital platforms as employees in the context of 
providing a basis for an interest to engage in conflict against the platform 
provider. Likewise, it would be in line with principles of labour law to 
allow for support of the main conflict with secondary actions, and to 
allow for employees organised in the same trade union to refuse to carry 
out work targeted by the action, as well as for (organised) service 
providers to engage in collective action themselves.  
4.3. LAWFULNESS OF BLOCKADE 
Lawful collective action against an employer can also be invoked in 
the form of a blockade. If the blockade is lawful according to collective 
labour law principles, the members of the negotiating trade union are 
obliged to follow such actions. This is the case for strikes as well as for 
blockades, even when the lawfulness under the Competition Act is not 
yet determined.  
                                                        
94 Above 4.1.1. 
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In a Supreme Court ruling of 2001,95 a freelance photographer was 
excluded from the Journalists Trade Union. The union produced new 
price lists for freelance press photographers. The media houses refused 
to pay the new prices. The union initiated a blockade, by which 
photographers were not allowed to deliver materials to media houses 
until the media houses consented to pay the new prices. One freelance 
photographer continued to deliver photos to a media house targeted by 
the blockade. As a consequence, the member was excluded. The Court 
found that the decision to impose a blockade on deliveries was a 
collective action in support of payments for services. It was of no effect 
on the validity and the lawfulness of the action under labour law that the 
action in support of the list could be rendered unlawful under the 
Competition Act. This did not give the member reason to believe that 
his deliveries were exempt from the blockade. The exclusion was upheld.  
The mechanism of imposing a blockade against an employer also 
binds freelancers that are members of the same trade union. The duty 
not to supply services rests on members performing work as employees 
as well as member performing work as self-employed. 
Collective agreements supported by collective action can only be 
concluded on behalf of employees. Service providers on digital platforms 
could, however, constitute a legal basis for collective action, as long as 
the service providers are not genuinely independent businesses but work 
on terms similar to those of employees.  
Likewise, the mechanism of industrial conflict can be invoked 
against a platform company using the services of persons that perform 
work as freelancers but are not genuinely independent businesses. If the 
main conflict is lawful, secondary conflicts could be invoked, and 
members of the same unions involved in the conflicts could refuse to 
perform strike-work. Likewise, the freelancers themselves are expected 
to adhere to a blockade against a company, e.g. a platform company. 
4.4. SCOPE OF A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT 
When the social partners have negotiated an agreement applicable 
to employees at an entity, the question arises regarding who at the entity 
is covered by the agreement. The agreement typically covers only work 
performed by employees.96 The Labour Court takes a functional rather 
than a formalistic approach when assessing whether persons performing 
work are employees or self-employed. 
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4.4.1. JURISDICTION OF THE LABOUR COURT 
The issue surfaced as early as 192297 before the Labour Court (then 
Permanent industrial Tribunal). The dispute concerned the uncertain 
employment status of milk-distributors, as their remunerations were 
calculated as payments per litre (milk, cream and butter) and not per 
hour. The Labour Court did not assume that the milk-distributors were 
self-employed persons, despite the remuneration scheme. The milk-
distributors were covered by the agreement and the complaint could be 
assessed by the Court.  
4.4.2. WHO IS COVERED 
In 2010 an Industrial Arbitration ruling98 assessed which of the 
freelance journalists working at the entity were covered by the collective 
agreement for freelancers, and who were on the other hand genuinely 
self-employed and not covered by the agreement. In his assessment, the 
arbitrator set a high threshold for persons being assessed as a freelancer 
working on employment terms. The presumption was that collective 
agreements cover only employees in a traditional sense. As neither the 
title of the agreement, nor specific elements during the negotiation 
process indicated otherwise, the trade union could not establish evidence 
that the parties had agreed to extend the agreement to freelance 
journalists working as self-employed, nor to freelance journalists working 
as atypical self-employed.  
The arbitrator assessed all the specific circumstances. The decisive 
element was whether the service providers had gained status as genuinely 
self-employed, i.e. registered businesses, paying sales taxes, performing 
and invoicing work under the auspices of the business, advertised their 
services as a business, used accountants, had several customers, used 
business contacts, worked from home or from a studio. The amount of 
work performed for the media company was not decisive.  
For the applicability of an agreement it is not sufficient to assess 
the relationship between the employer and the service provider, 
including the similarities to employment. The assessment also takes into 
consideration the factual business setup of the self-employed person.  
For platform work, this assessment would be similarly carried out. 
The amount of work performed by the individual service providers is 
not decisive, whereas the specifics of the relationship as well as the 
business setup of the service providers are. Some service providers 
perform work from an organised business setup, indicative of status as 
genuinely self-employed and would not be covered by the agreement. 
Other service providers at the same platform, on the same contracts and 
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performing the same work would have less organised business setups – if 
any, and would thus be covered by the agreement.  
5. FIRST COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT FOR PLATFORM WORK 
In April 2018, 3F and the digital platform Hilfr concluded a 
collective agreement for cleaners performing cleaning services via the 
Hilfr app.  
The agreement is valid for 1 year from August 2018 with a view to 
be renegotiated in 2019 as a 3-year agreement. The parties to the 
agreement state that this is a first attempt to connect digital platforms 
with the Danish model. The purpose is inter alia to gain experiences from 
the first agreement with a view to establish more permanent agreements 
in the future. The agreement is innovative.  
The agreement applies to ‘employed cleaning assistants’, but not to 
‘freelancers’ otherwise associated with the platform. The agreement 
assigns the cleaners a default status as freelancers for the first 100 hours 
of services. When a cleaner has performed 100 hours of service, the 
status automatically changes to one of ‘employee’. From this point on, 
the agreement starts to apply to the service provider (now employee). 
The agreement does not preclude the cleaner from choosing ‘employee’-
status before having provided 100 hours of services, or to retain his/her 
‘freelancer’-status after having provided 100 hours of services. This is a 
major novelty for collective agreements. The agreement provides the 
workers themselves with an unrestricted choice of being covered or not 
being covered by the agreement. Another novelty is that the agreement 
provides the worker with an unrestricted choice of status in the 
relationship with the platform provider, choosing his/her own status as 
either employee or freelancer. This is not in line with the principles for 
determining status as employee developed in Danish labour and 
employment law. 
The platform can refuse a request for ‘employee’-status from 
cleaners who have worked less than 100 hours if providing a fair and 
objective reason for such refusal. The standard of fair and objective 
reasons is well-established in Danish labour law and refers to reasons 
concerned with the conduct of business.99   
Employed cleaning assistants are entitled to an hourly minimum 
pay corresponding to the sectoral agreement. The employee is entitled to 
charge higher hourly rates - but not lower. The agreement grants the 
employee several novel rights: partial payment in case of late cancellation 
of accepted cleaning jobs, pension contributions paid by Hilfr, holidays 
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with pay, sick leave pay, protection against removal of profile (or 
otherwise making the profile inaccessible) without due cause and only 
after notice in writing, and an explicit right to daily breaks, and daily and 
weekly rest periods.  
The parties agree not to be bound by the provisions in the 
agreement after the expiry or termination of the agreement. This is 
likewise novel in Danish collective labour law, as it is customary that the 
employer continues to be obliged to apply the provisions in the 
agreement until a new agreement has been concluded by the same 
parties, or until the parties have endured a collective dispute of a certain 
length and severity.100 
6. DISCUSSION 
6.1. FIRST ATTEMPT FOR AGREEMENT FOR PLATFORM WORKERS.  
Choosing to negotiate an agreement specific to platform work 
builds on the understanding that the service providers would not already 
be covered by existing agreements. The less innovative and more 
traditional approach would have been to assess the status of the cleaners 
according to the normal concept of employee in Danish labour law and 
the case law of the Labour Court and industrial arbitration, and assess 
whether the cleaners could in fact be covered by existing collective 
agreements for cleaners. A strict and more traditional interpretation of 
the scope for freelance or non-typical employees would be in line with 
the arbitrator’s assessment of the application of the journalists’ 
agreement in 2010, above 4.4.2. However, special emphasis was made on 
the business setup of the self-employed freelancers. In this the cleaners 
at Hilfr would perhaps differ. The trade union adhered to the notion that 
a special agreement is required. 
Second, the agreement aims at solving a number of issues by 
adapting certain provisions of working conditions to persons performing 
work via digital platforms. With regard to these substantial provisions, 
the agreement constitutes a significant step forward regarding job 
security, wage standards and social security measures for persons 
performing work via platforms. Classifying the persons as employees and 
providing the employees with typical workers’ rights and remunerations 
constitutes a solid step forward and indeed a solution in part.  
Third, giving the employees an unrestricted choice to opt-in or opt-
out of the collective agreement is in conflict with the basic elements of 
collective labour law.  
Allowing individual derogations of an entire agreement goes against 
a fundamental feature of collective agreements on the part of the 
workers’ association – to be binding by nature thereby securing the rights 
of their members. Collective agreements in Denmark have mandatory 
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effect; that is, employers and employees bound by a collective agreement 
are not allowed to reach individual agreements in conflict with the 
collectively negotiated terms. This is also referred to as the inderogability 
of collective agreements.101 Inderogability prevents individual 
derogations from, for instance, working time provisions in an agreement, 
which is in the strong interest of the employee association inter alia 
because of the imbalance in the bargaining power of the individual 
employee towards the employer – an imbalance brought back into  
balance by the collectivity in the collective bargaining.102 
The general theoretical approach of asymmetry in bargaining power 
of the employer and the employee also presents questions as to the 
element of free choice. Putting the worker in a position to individually 
choose to opt-in or opt-out of the collectively bargained provisions 
could be viewed with some scepticism. Traditionally, such options are 
frowned upon, as they allow the employer to exercise coercion on the 
worker, to opt-out of the binding collective provisions and instead 
negotiate individually, in a setting of implied stronger bargaining power 
by the employer. This sincerely questions the element of ‘free choice’ of 
the worker agreeing to provisions negotiated individually and in the 
interest of the employer. This debate has surfaced in Denmark in recent 
times. In 2002, the Part-time Act, Deltidsloven,103 was amended to provide 
a legal basis for the employer and employee to agree to a part-time 
working arrangement, allowing such individual agreement to overrule 
any limitations in collective agreements. The amendment was intensely 
debated in the parliament Labour Market Committee, 
Arbejdsmarkedsudvalget.104 The notion of ‘voluntarily’ agreeing to part-time 
work was heavily criticised. The critics stated that the option to 
individually agree on terms counter to terms collectively negotiated 
‘removes the protection of the worker from the collective agreement, 
and the employer becomes the stronger party’. The critics also 
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maintained that the proposal allowed the employer to force the 
individual employee into a part-time agreement, with a reduction of 
wages as a consequence.105 The political compromise in 2002 was to 
establish two conditions for the admissibility of part-time agreements 
contrary to collective agreements: 1) Part-time work can only be agreed 
to during the employment relationship, not upon employment,106 and 2) 
provisions in collective agreements requiring a minimum of 15 hours of 
work per week must be respected.107  
The free choice of application is novel and surprising. The worker’s 
association is bound by the collective agreement and cannot enforce the 
provisions of the agreement if their members have chosen to opt out of 
the agreement. 
However, if a member, despite choosing to opt out of the 
employee status, would in fact be regarded as an employee under EU 
law108 concerning, for instance, a right to protection against 
discrimination on grounds of race, or a right to equal pay, the collective 
agreement cannot preclude the employee her right to invoke inter alia a 
right to equal pay or a compensation for direct discrimination.  
 The agreement does not frame the 100 hours threshold into a 
stipulated period of, for instance, two months. A freelancer meeting the 
threshold after a long period of, for instance 10 months, has only had 12 
hours a month work through the platform on average, and will from that 
point on be regarded as an employee with regards to the agreement.  
Conversely, a freelancer opting in or automatically receiving status 
as employee with a right to minimum pay under the agreement can result 
in a breach of the Competition Act, if the freelancer is genuinely self-
employed. Self-employed persons collectively establishing agreements 
regarding their fees have been deemed cartels by the CJEU as well as by 
national courts.109  
Questions that arise are: what is considered fair and objective 
reasons for dismissing workers for putting forth a request to become 
employees? How will the duty of not undermining the agreement play 
out for the platform? How will the provision on allowing the agreement 
to be terminated without a new agreement and without a termination 
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conflict be interpreted by the parties given its conflict with the procedure 
set out in section 9 of the Act on a Labour Court? How will the workers 
react when the initiative is placed with them for being freelance, not 
covered by the agreement, or being an employee, covered by the 
agreement, and what is the legal framework for coercion by the platform 
by way of other means than dismissal? And how will the fixed threshold 
of 100 hours be interpreted as this is not in accordance with the 
principles developed in labour law nor in competition law? How are the 
100 hours calculated – can a service provider fall out of the scope of the 
agreement again, e.g. if having been on leave or travelling and starting 
over, and how will any remunerations, pensions and holiday payments in 
this case be calculated? Which hours count towards the 100 hours, how 
about jobs that have not been concluded satisfactorily, or where the user 
made last-minute-cancellations? Can the service provider change his/her 
mind, and opt-in/opt-out at will? Could the parties agree on a partial 
opt-in/opt-out and thus choose to apply some of the provisions, but not 
others?  
The trial agreement is a remarkable attempt at resolving the 
difficult relationship between the binary divide and platform work and is 
novel as it introduces innovative features from a Danish collective labour 
law perspective. The effects remain to be seen, i.e. the purpose of 
concluding the agreement as a trial agreement. 
6.2. PLATFORM WORK AND COMPETITION LAW.  
Although the ruling of FNV was a novelty in EU competition law, 
platform work may not be entirely compatible with the facts in the FNV 
case. Most notably, service providers via platforms will most often not 
perform services alongside permanently employed persons performing 
the same job. On the other hand, the work performed and the 
conditions for performing the work to a large extent resembles normal 
cleaning assistant work elsewhere in the industry. The elements of having 
the liberty to arrange their own working hours and the liberty to accept 
or decline jobs offered, are not similar to employees in comparable 
employments as cleaners.  
Some elements are worth looking further into. In the freelance 
journalists’ cases of the Tribunal, the Tribunal looked to the cause for 
not being covered by a collective agreement. In the competition cases, 
the Tribunal stated that the element of the media house being covered 
by a collective agreement or not, was an element outside the control of 
the freelance journalist, and in itself could not render that the 
employment status changed according to features related to the recipient 
of the services, when all other aspects were the same, including the setup 
of the freelance journalists. The same applies in the case of platform 
work. The cause for the service provider to be self-employed in this 
context is primarily controlled by the employer. The contractual setup as 




unless in the situations where the service provider has chosen a setup as 
genuinely self-employed. This element of the choice being outside the 
control of the service provider could likewise play a role in assessing 
whether collective agreements concluded for persons perhaps self-
employed perhaps employees would be assessed as providing pay and 
working conditions in line with section 3 of the Competition Act.   
One final argument to be explored is whether it could be said that 
an association of workers is still considered a social partner when 
negotiating a collective agreement and bargaining for minimum fees for 
genuinely self-employed persons, if the association is acting solely in the 
interest of its own members, the employees. The objective of the 
negotiations of the association for the genuinely self-employed would be 
to prevent ‘social dumping’ or in other terms prevent a ‘race to the 
bottom’.110 In her Opinion to the FNV case, AG Wahl made a 
compelling argument for the exemption to Article 101(1) TFEU to also 
include such agreements by applying a perspective on the social policy 
objectives of collective bargaining.111 
She argued that the elimination of wage competition between 
workers — the raison d’être for collective bargaining — implies that an 
employer under no circumstances can hire other workers for a salary 
below the one set out in the collective agreement. On that basis, and 
from the perspective of a worker, why should there be a difference if she 
is replaced by a less costly worker or by a less costly self-employed 
person. According to AG Wahl, preventing social dumping is an 
objective that can be legitimately pursued by a collective agreement 
containing rules affecting self-employed persons and that it may also 
constitute one of the core subjects of negotiation. Further, she points 
out, that in the Laval case, the Court accepted that the right to take 
collective action for the protection of the workers of the Member State 
against possible social dumping may constitute an overriding reason of 
public interest within the meaning of the case-law of the Court which, in 
principle, justifies a restriction of one of the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty.112 
There still seems to be avenues of pursuit available for the trade 
unions to aim at concluding collective agreements with the digital 
platform providers on behalf of their service providers. The outer limits 
are set by competition law, EU labour law and Danish labour law that 
the worker must not be genuinely self-employed.  
For collective bargaining to be lawful under Danish law, self-
employed persons providing services on terms more similar to those 
characteristic of employees than of self-employed would form the basis 
for a recognised interest for trade unions to initiate demands for a 
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collective agreement to be concluded, including by way of collective 
action. Likewise, all collective action remedies could be put into play 
when supporting a demand for collective agreement, also for those in 
less than typical employment.  
Finally, the element of combatting social dumping by concluding 
collective agreements for all persons performing work within the sector, 
including those working on less than typical employee terms, could be 
used as leverage in order to fulfil the criteria for not being in breach of 
competition law in the EU and in Denmark, as well as for abiding by the 
requirements of recognised interest established under Danish collective 
labour law.  
Platform work and the Danish model are not inherently 
incompatible, regardless of the contractual terms of ‘self-employed’ or 
the setup of many small contracts of service. Labour law as well as 
competition law from the CJEU and national courts provide appropriate, 
clear and specific legal principles that can be put into practice when 
approaching the issues concerned with platform work in the context of 
the Danish model. This would perhaps give leverage to negotiating the 
next generation of collective agreements applicable to persons providing 
services via digital platforms, as existing principles would bring the 
agreements some way, and this could perhaps moderate the urgency for 
inventing brand new solutions on all accounts.  
6.3. PLATFORM WORK AND FLEXICURITY.  
Flexicurity and collective bargaining are key components of the 
Danish welfare model. Flexicurity consists of three elements: flexible 
labour laws allowing employers flexibility in terminating employment 
relationships, generous state-financed unemployment benefits securing a 
basic income for workers during periods of unemployment, and an 
active labour market policy inter alia promoting and financing acquiring 
skills and education to meet the changing needs of the market.113 
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The possibility of completing collective agreements for workers is 
the primary and preferred tool for ensuring proper working conditions 
for workers in all industries in Denmark. Moreover, the agreements 
provide a level of protection against arbitrary dismissals, thus moderating 
the ‘flexible’ part of the flexicurity model. The agreements also provide a 
certain minimum level salary which is necessary in order to be eligible for 
social security benefits, when out of employment.   
The criteria for being eligible for social security payments in times 
of unemployment, sickness, retirement or other types of supported 
leaves from active employment should be a smooth fit, in order to 
ensure easy transition and an efficient ‘security’ part of flexicurity. In the 
current realities of an increased fragmentation in career paths and in 
employment, updating the legal criteria for eligibility for benefits to 
constitute a proper fit has been on the agenda of the social partners as 
well as the government lately. The first initiative was the amendment to 
the regulation on unemployment payments,114 where several types of 
work now can count towards the working hours thresholds for 
becoming eligible for social security payments.  
The blurred lines between what constitutes work as employee or 
work as self-employed could be set straight by collective agreements for 
platform workers, whereas with the current agreement, this is not 
entirely clear yet.    
There is still some way to go for the social partners and the 
platform providers to meet and negotiate proper pay and working 
conditions for the persons who are not genuinely self-employed. The 
algorithms and digital apps are new tools enabling new, fast and 
extended ways of creating contact, exchanging services and creating a 
basis for business, whereas the service of personal labour remains more 
or less the same. 
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